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Human Capital and Economic Growth
ABSTRACT
Individuals differ in both inherited and acquired abilities, but only
the latter differ among countries and time periods. Human capital analysis
deals with acquired capabilities which are developed through formal and
informal education at school and at home, and through training, experience,
and mobility in the labor market.
Just as accumulation of personal human capital produces individual
economic (income) growth, so do the corresponding social or national aggre-
gates. At the national level, human capital can be viewed as a factor
of production coordinate with physical capital. This implies that its
contribution to growth is greater the larger the volume of physical capital
and vice versa. The framework of an aggregate production function shows
also that the growth of human capital is both a condition and a consequence
of economic growth.
Human capital activities involve not merely the transmission and em—
bodiment in people of available knowledge, but also the production of new
knowledge which is the source of innovation and of technical change which
propels all factors of production. This latter function of human capital
generates worldwide economic growth regardless of its initial geographic
locus.
Contrary to Malthus, economic growth has not been eliminated by popu-
lation growth. Indeed, spatial and temporal patterns of the "demographic
transition" appear to be congruent with economic growth. Human capital is
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HUMANCAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
I. Introduction
As an economic concept human capital is at least two centuries old,
but its incorporation into the mainstream of economic analysis and research
is a new and lively development of the past two decades. The need for this
development became apparent in the 1950's, when the application of empirical
economic research to the concerns about economic growth and about income
distribution revealed major defects not only in our understanding of each
but also in our way of thinking about these matters. Two types of findings
were especially significant:(1) The observed growth of conventionally
measured inputs of labor and capital was by far smaller than the growth of
output in the U.S. and in other countries for which long time series were
available, and (2) Data on personal income distribution, which began to appear
with greater frequency and detail ,showedthat the variance of labor incomes,
rather than the "functional" differences between returns to labor and to
capital, represented the major component of personal income inequality.
The development of human capital theory was a response to these twin
challenges. This response did not require a revolution in economic theory
or a resort to extra—economic explanations which economists sometimes invoke
when answers to pressing questions escape their competence. It merely in-
volved the abolition of two simplifying, but as it turned out unduly inhibit-
ing assumptions: (1) the restriction of the concept of capital to physical
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capital, even after a more general definition was providedby Irving Fisher,1
and (2) the assumption of homogeneous labor which underlies boththe concept
of functional income distribution and the measurement of laborinput in
manhours.
Fisher's definition of capital asany asset that gives rise to an
income stream requires the inclusion of humancapital, even if it cannot
be. bought and sold (it is, ofcourse, rented), and even though investhent.s
in such capital often involve non—market activities. Butnon—market acti-
vities are not necessarily extra-economic. To the extent thatthey involve
costs and returns, whether explicit or implicit, they are amenable to
economic analysis, even if measurement problems are difficult. Thecon-
tribution of human capital theory to economics does not lie ina reformu-
lation of economic theory, but in pushing back the boundaries ofeconomics
beyond the sphere of market transactions. The payoff is now apparent in
both of the problematic contexts:(1) At the macroeconomic level, the
social stock of human capital and its growth are central to theprocess
of economic growth. (2) At the niicroeconomic level, differences in indi-
vidual human capital stocks and in their growth can explain much of the
observed variation in the wage structure and. in the personal distribution
of income.
The application of the human capital concept to economic growth and
to labor economics were initially pioneered independently.2 Theconcepts
are the same, and are applied basically to the same problem: individual
economic growth at the micro—level, and growth of theeconomy at the macro—
level.—3—
II. Human Capital and Personal Economic Growth
Individuals differ in both inherited and acquired abilities, but only
the latter clearly differ among countries and time periods. Human capital
analysis deals with acquired capacities which are developed through formal
and informal education at school and at home, and through training, exper-
ience, and mobility in the labor market. The central idea of human capital
theory is that whether deliberate or not, these activities involve costs
and benefits and can, therefore, be analyzed as economic decisions, private
or public. The costs involve direct expenses and earnings or consumption
foregone by students, by trainees, and by workers engaged in labor mobility.
Since production and consumption benefits from these activities accrue
mainly in the future, and are for the most part quite durable, the costly
acquisition of human capacities is an act of investment. Deterioration of
health and erosion or obsolescence of skills represent the depreciation of
human capital which is offset, though not indefinitely, by maintenance
activities such as the production of health and retraining.
The general categories of human capital investments can be described
in a life—cycle chronology: resources in child care and child development
represent pre—school investments. These overlap and are followed by invest-
ments in formal school education. Investments in labor market mobility,
job choice, job training, and work effort occur during the working life,
while investments in ha1th and other maintenance activities continue
throughout life.
•School Education
Initially, investment in school education has been the subject of
almost exclusive attention by human capital analysts. While economists-4-
since Adam Smith recognized the importance of education as atype of pri-
vate or social investment, only recently have economists undertaken
rigorous conceptual and statistical examination of the evidence on costs,
returns, and rates of return to education.
The costs of education borne by the student or hisparents consist
not merely of tuition and other school expenditures, but also offoregone
earnings——the loss of what the student could have earned if he had spent
the school years in gainful employment instead. Beyond earlyschooling,
foregone earnings are the largest component (over a half) of schooling
costs.
As in the analysis of physical capital,thedifference between the
discounted future returns and casts represents the profit or loss on the
investment. Gains do or ought to induce further schooling and losses
discourage it. Another way to represent this decision making process is
to calculate that rate of interest which makes the profit equal tozero,
that is, it makes the investment just about worthwhile. This rate is
called the internal rate of return on the investment; furtherschooling
is encouraged if the internal rate of return on schooling exceeds the rate
on alternative investments. The advantage of this approach is that while
individual discount rates are not observable, internal rates of return can
be calculated given estimates of costs and of earnings streams. Comparisons
of rates of return to education with rates of return on other (say in busi-
ness capital) investments, can indicate the desirability of existing alloca-
tions or of changes in them, since equality of rates in all types of invest-
ments are required for a social optimum.
it is understood, of course, that relevant concepts of costs and bene-
fits are real, that is not restricted to pecuniary terms. Education itself—5—
may be attractive and it may enhancefuture enjoyment of life, apart from
the monetary gain.
Employers pay higher wages to the more educated workers because their
skill and productivity are seen and experienced as greater than that of less
educated workers. In the absence of strong barriers to supply, the
wage differential translates into a r3te of return com-
parable to those on alternative human or other investments. Increases in
demand favoring more educated workers raise the rate of returnon school-
ing, inducing growth of enrollments until the increased return has been
reduced back to an equilibrium level. Autonomous increases in supply,
given no changes in demand, reduce the rate of return to education and thus
become self-limiting. The estimated rates of return to schooling in the
U.S. have remained relatively stable in the past several decades despite
the continuous growth of educational attainment, suggesting that the trend
is mainly a response to the continuous growth of demand for educated labor.
If financial and social barriers to education are stronger than in
other fields of investment, the rate of return on education exceeds that
on physical capital. Reduction of these barriers brought about by wide-
spread growth of family incomes and by public policy has also been a factor
in the long—term growth of education. As an example, the growth of educa-
tion in the U.S. between 1890 and 1950 was accompanied bya decline in the
rate of return to education, to levels which no longer exceed the return
to business investment.3
A recent survey of estimates made in 32 countries4 shows that rates
on physical and especially on human capital investments are higher in
developing countries (LDC's) than in the industrialized (DC's). This is—6—
-'perhaps not surprising as it reflects the greater scarcity of capital in
LX's. More interesting is the finding that, rates of return to human capital
exceed the rates on business capital in LDC's, while if anything the appo-
site appears to be true in the DC's. Evidently, the scarcity of human
capital is significantly greater than the scarcity of physical capital in
the LDC's.5
The calculations that are available do not include non—pecuniary
or 'consumptioncomponents" ofcosts or of returns. To the extent that
these are positive and important in the benefits of schooling (an assump-
tion dear to the hearts of educators), the rates are underestimated,
though the pattern of their historical changes need not be affected.
An important distinction is made between private and social rates.
Thus, in calculating private rates, costs and returns to students and their
families are computed from after-tax data, and schooling costs do not
include public financing of schools.In contrast, the calculation of
social cost is based on before—tax- earnings, and school costs are total
costs of the relevant school system (per student) regardless of the source
of financing. The real difficulty in calculating social rates of return
is the problem of measuring externalities. To the extent that the gain
to society exceeds the sum of gains to students, social returns are under-
estimated. An assumption of public policy which is difficult to verify
and.to quantify is that such externalities are substantial and positive.
It is often suggested that these externalities include, among others,
informed and responsible citizenship, comunications skills, lawful behavior,
and standards of health. The existence of such externalities is invoked to
justify public efforts to stimulate educational investments. Such efforts—7—
can take the form of a publicly owned school system and/or direct
subsidies to students. The extent of required support is always
debatable, as the magnitude of externalities is unknown.
There are also other reasons for public intervention. This is
the concern with the distribution rather than with the total volume
of educational investnents. Helping children of thepoor to acquire
a minimal degree of earning power is an objective for which schooling
is also viewed as an instrument. Since poverty is often viewed as
a relative concept, thefl amount of minimal universal government
supported education has been progressively lengthening as average
education (and income) have increased. It is not always clear, how-
ever, to what extent these policies are efficient in alleviating
poverty. There is some evidence6 that public spending on primary
education tends to be redistributive toward the poor, but that above
that in LDC's, and above secondary education in DC's, the opposite
is likely to be true, on balance, since children of thepoor are
less likely to acquire higher education.
2. Post—school Human Capital Investments7
There is no reason to believe that human capital investments cease
with the termination of schooling. The educated have higher earnings, but
the earnings are not fixed. They grow over the working life, albeit at a
decelerating pace. This growth is additional to, and largely independent
of economy—wide trends in earnings. These patterns of growth also differ
among persons whose education is similar.
The economic interpretation of lifetime earnings growth is as fol-
lows: Wages of a worker are proportionate to the size of his human capital-
stock.Thus, wage differentials among workers are due primarily to dif-
ferencesin human capital stacks, not in the "rental price" employers
pay per unit of the stock. The individual Phumancapital stock grows
over the life cycleS by means of investment, which is initially in school-
ing, later in job choice, job training, job mobility, and in health. At
any stage, the level of earnings depends on the size and utilization of
the human capital which accumulated up to this point, and its growth depends
on the rate of net additions to the stock, that is, on the net investment
rate. The deceleration in the rate of growth which is observed in indi-
vidual earnings reflects the rate of decline of investments as the worker
ages. Investments diminish over time because (1) benefits decline as the
payoff period (remaining work life) shortens, and (2) the opportunity costs
of time, which is an input in the learning process, are likely to rise over
the working life. While gross investment proceeds at a slackening rate
throughout working life, net investments (gross minus depreciation) vanish
or turn negative earlier. This happens when depreciation (including obso-
lescence) begins to outstrip maintenance, a progression which eventually
brings about retirement.
An alternative interpretation of the earnings profile is that it is
an intrinsic age phenomenon; initial productivity growth corresponds to
inherent biological and psychological maturation, while later stability
and decline are due tO first stable then declining physical and intellec-
tual vigor.In the perspective of human capital, this view is incomplete
since it explains the earnings profile solely by a life—cycle pattern of
the depreciation rate, seen as negative in early years, zero in middle
life, and positive in later years. There is evidence, however, which—9—.
indicates that this inherent age—depreciation factor affects earnings only
to a minor degree, except at teenage and in the near or post-retirement
years; in data where age and length of work experience are statistical ly
separable, levels and shapes of earnings curves are mainly a function of
experience rather than of age. Moreover, earnings profiles differ by
occupation, sex, and other characteristics in systematic ways that cannot
be attributed to agtng.
One may also interpret the shape of the earnings profile as a
"learning curve," or a reflection of growth of skills with age and exper-
ience known as "learning by doing." This view is not at all inconsistent
with the human capital investment interpretation, as long as opportunities
for learning are not costless. Since more learning, hence a more steeply
rising wage is available in same jobs compared to others, qualified
workers would gravitate to such jobs if learning were thought to be
costless. In consequence, entry wage levels in such jobs would be re-
duced relative to entry wages elsewhere, for workers of the same quality,
thereby creating opportunity investment costs in moving to such jobs.
Thus, it is not merely training on the job (formal or informal), but also
the processes of occupational choice that give rise to investments beyond
schooling. Similarly, geographic mobility and other labor turnover in
search of higher real earnings represent investments in human capital
It follows that barriers to occupational choice and to job
mobility reduce the opportunities for investment in human capital. The
elimination of such barriers increases individual economic growth and
the overall efficiency of allocation of resources in the economy,
hence total product.—10—
Empirical economic research indicates that the relation between
schooling and post—school investment is positive: More educated people
invest more in the labor market. One interpretation is that ability and
opportunity factors which induce individuals to have more schooling affect
their post—school behavior similarly, even though the correlation is far
from strict: Abilities and opportunities change over the life—cycle,
and there is a fair amount of substitution between the two forms of skill
accumulation. Another interpretation is that schooling improves the effi-
ciency with which people can absorb learning on the jab, leading thereby
to greater job investments. This hypothesis is consistent, in a dynamic
context, with evidence on the so—called "worker allocative effect" pro-
pounded by Schultz (1976) and Welch (l97a). Their proposition that educa-
tion promotes the adjustment to technological change has been documented,
mainly in studies of agricultural production activities. The more limited
macro-economic evidence of a positive relation between rates of return to
schooling and.rates of economic growth is also suggestive.9
3. Preschool Investments and Women's Education
Inherited abilities, or what is called the 'original" endowment is
an important part of the human capital stock, yet the line between heredity
and Environment is by rio means clear. Much of the physical and intellec-
tual deficiency shown by infants born in poor conditions can be avoided
by improved nutrition of mothers and sanitary environments for childbirth.
Similarly, subsequent child care represents an investment in better adult
health and so in greater productivity of the adult worker.
Especially In low income countries, the effects of a healthier child
rearing on adult productivity are double: Not only is a healthier adult—11—
more productive but he also lives longer10 Consequently, the incentives
to invest in lengthier schooling and training increase, since withthe
lengthened payoff period, the profitability of such investments increases.
Thus, it is inappropriate to view reductions in mortality with alarmas a
cause of the "population explosion." The mitigating effects on population
growth and improvements in work quality eventually predominate, since
the costs of investing in child quality, including health and education,
represent a powerful force toward reduction of family size; given the
families' limited resources. Indeed, research has shown that even at the
same level of family income, children in smaller families tend to be
healthier, more intelligent and better educated.
Much of the accumulation of a person's human capital takes Ølace
in the home, particularly during the pre—school stage of the life—cycle.
It appears that education of parents is a significant influence in this
process, even after controlling for family income and numbers of siblings.
This suggests that aside from expenditures on schooling and health,
child care is also an important qualitative input into the production
of human capital. The time inputs are usually those of the
mothers who take the major child care responsibilities and reduce their
market activities to engage in them. The consequent reduction in their
earnings may be viewed as a partial measure of opportunity costs of these
investments. So viewed, the opportunity cost o ehild care isgreater, for
more educated women. The observed positive effects on children's health,
intelligence, education and future earning power may thus be viewed as an
indirect return on the investment in maternal education.
An important consequence of the larger opportunity costper unitof—12—
time spent in child care by more educated mothers is the reduction of total
time so spent. This is accomplished largely by•a reduction in the number
of children. The strong inverse relation between fertility and education
of mothers has been documented repeatedly. Thus the growth of women1s edu-
cation and of their wages induces declines in fertility coupled with in-
creased investments in the resultant smaller number of children per family.
Since, in most countries, evsi educated women spend less time in the
labor market than men, the direct earnings benefits of education are smaller
for women. From this point of view, It might seem that the provision of
equal amounts of education to both sexes is wasteful .However,if better
educated mothers produce greater human capital In children and a better
quality of family life, apart from contributing to family money income,
educational equality need not be questioned. Indeed, it is rarely questioned
as a matter of public policy.
It appears, however, that private schooling decisions are still very
much influenced by the expected participation in the labor market, and
therefore by the directly expected payoff in earnings.In the U.S. sex
differentials in enrollment now appear only at the postgraduate university
a..-(r.. o.4 &jc
level .IxutatinAmerica there remains a pronounced differential above
primary school enrollment.—13—
III. Human Capital and National Economic Growth
1. Human Capital as a Factor of Production. The micro—economic
analysis of investilent in human capital is the underpinning of our under-
standing of the contribution of human capital to the aggregate level of
income and to its rate of growth. The micro—economic view is most directly
applicable to the analysis of labor heterogeneity and of the resulting
wage structure. Given sufficient labor mobility, wages tend to be simi-
lar for the same human capital stock in various employments, regardless
of differences in size and quality of other factors of production in
such employments. Equilibrium wage differentials within the economy may
therefore be viewed as reflecting solely differences in individual magni-
tudes of human capital stocks. Although international mobility of labor
is not negligible and it mitigates somewhat the disparities in wages of the
same human capital in different countries, national wage levels' differ because
of differences in volumes of human capital as well as of other forms of
capital. For the understanding of macro—economic differences in levels
and in growth of income It is best to start with the view of human capital
as a factor of production alongside physical capital in an aggregate
production function
The traditional trinity of factors of production contained land
viewed as fixed, "original and indestructible," labor measured in numbers
and hours, and capital •restricted to tangible plant and equipment. It is
now well recognized that this conception is false. The notion of a quantity
of land as a fixed factor of production has already been discarded prior to
the realization that the measurement of labor in manhours is entirely inade-
quate. As T. W. Schultz hasemphasizedl2differerices in amount and "original
quality" of arable land (in terms of land—population ratios) do not at all-14-
neip in accounting for differences in income levels among countries. Exper-
ience and research have shown that it is not the quantity and the original
endowment of land, so much as the improvement or modernization of agri-
culture that matters. Inferior raw lands and even deserts have been trans-
formed into superior productive resources, while totalacreage declined.
Investment in modernization of agriculture is a capital investment, and
the capital nature of land is now fully recognized.
The capital nature of the sources of labor services is now also re-
ceiving its proper recognition. The inadequacy of the traditional view
of labor in the field of growth accounting is well known. But the biases
went beyond description to affect policy: The misunderstanding of the
nature of expenditures on health, education, labor mobility, and informa-
tion as consumption which reduces saving lead to investments in steel
mills rather than in people.
Land, by itself, is no longer a limiting or critical factor. But
the quality and behavior of people is increasingly recognized as such.
Indeed, it appears that indexes of human capital, such as average levels
of education, are more strongly correlated with average income levels
across countries than measures of physical capital per unit of labor.
13
Although suggestive, this finding is not conclusive since the demand for
education as a consumer good is income elastic. In this sense, education
is an effect rather than a cause of income. The role of education as a
cause, however, is evident from the micro—economic findings that the rela-
tion between education of persons and their own future income is strong
and largely unaffected by parental income, even though parents' income
does affect the amount of education their children receive.14—15—
Some critics question the inference that education increases pro-
ductivity from the observation that it increases wages, and still others
assert that schools do not affect skills but serve merely as a filter to
sort differences in ability which exist independently of schooling. If
so the micro—economic relation between education and income would not
carry over to the economy as a whole. This argument is contradicted by
research: Studies of empirical production functions have shown that not
only differences in wage rates but differences in productivity are related
to differences in education and training of the labor force across states,
regions, and over time.15
This is not to say that the screening or sorting function of educa-
tion is unimportant or unproductive. Indeed, the search for talent by
the school and by the student are activities no less productive than the
search for any other scarce natural resource. Human capital is augmented
both by learning and by selection. The interaction of the two is efficient:
The more able student learns more at the same cost.
The view of human capital as a factor of production coordinate with
physical capital implies that its contribution to growth is greater the
larger the volume of physical capital. This relation is symmetric: The
contribution of physical capital is larger the higher the average level of
human capital. In this light, the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe
and the failure of foreign aid to LDC's are perhaps not surprising. To
quote Harry Johnson: "Europe had available the industrial and comercial
organization, and the skilled people required for modern industry; what it
lacked was precisely physical capital which was largely destroyed or obsolete.
The problem of LDC's was different: They lacked virtually everything—16—
necessary for a higher standard of economic productivity, and the injection
of only one element (physical capital).was found to be both wasteful and
disappointing."16
For the more recent period the problem of absorption of massive
amounts of physical capital in the human capital—poor OPEC countries is
another example of the significance of compiementarity between the two
forms of capital. But, while physical plant and equipment can be acquired
or built quite rapidly, the development of a significant and broadly based
level of human capital of a nation is a lengthy process which involves
profound social and cultural changes)7
The framework of an aggregate production function makes it clear
that the growth of human capital is both a condition and a consequence of
economic growth. The growth of human capital raises the marginal product
of physical capital which induces further accumulation of physical capital
thus raising total output both directly and indirectly. Conversely and
symmetrically, the growth of physical capital raises the marginal product
of human capital. This produces an increased demand for human capital
relative to unskilled labor, if human capital is more complementary with
physical capital than is unskilled labor)8 The resulting increase in the
skill wage differential exceeds the increase in (opportunity) costs, so
the acquisition of human capital by students and workers becomesrnore pro-
fitable. As already indicated, the continuous long—term growth of human
capital in the U.S. and elsewhere is consistent with this interpretation of
supply responses to growing demand.
The differential shifts in demand forskilled and unskilled labor
implied by the complementarity hypothesis also tend to produce the well known—17-
skill differentials in unemployment rates, observable in most countries
which experience economic growth. The greater cyclicalstability of
employment of skilled labor is also consistent with the hypothesis that -
skilledlabor is complementary with fixed plant andequipment. Actually,
recent research suggests that both wages and employment of skilled labor
are relatively insensitive to the business cycle, because human capital
acquired on the job contains elements of finn specificity which make
separations unprofitable to both workers and firms)9
Growth of human capital is also spurred on thesupply side by
growth of family incomes. Since markets for financing of human capital
investJnts do not exist, growth of income enables larger numbers of
people to self-finance their human capital investments. Inpoor countries,
these financial restrictions create monopolisticadvantages for the children
of the wealthy, and high rates of return on humancapital. Both are reduced
by the spread of education made possible by growing incomes.However,
human capital growth due to growth of family incomes iseventually self—
limiting, when rates of return become sufficiently depressed inconsequence
of "overeducation.' Public subsidies are alsoself-limiting in the same
sense, and they may become unprofitable from a social point of view (when
the social rate of return on human capital drops below thecorresponding
rate on physical capital) before they inhibit private incentives. It fol-
lows that for a sustained growth of human capitalwe must look to increasing
market demands for skills and technology.-18-
2. HumanCapitaland Technology1 Although the effects of human
capital growth and some of its causes can be described in the framework of
an aggregate production function in which technology is fixed, few will argue
against the view that growth of technology Is the ultimate force which propels
all factors of production by increasing their productivity. A fixed tech-
nology may be maintained for analytical convenience by viewing all technical
change as embodied in human and in physical capital.2° Whether or not such
a device is purely semantic, I think it is helpful to distinguish between
the stock of human capital as a standard factor of production and the stock
of knowledge as the source of technology. Human capital activities involve
not merely the transmission and embodiment of available knowledge in people,
but also the production of new knowledge which is the source of innovation
and of technical change. Without new knowledge, it is doubtful that larger
quantities of existing physical capital, more widespread education and health would
create a continous growth in productivity on a global scale.In a fundamental
sense, modern economic growth is a result of the scientific revolution,
that is, of the growth of systematized scientific knowledge.
The geographic origin and spread of the industrial revolution since
the 18th Century supports this view and the pivotal role of human capital
in generating and facilitating it. The industrial revolution started with
the scientific revolution in the Northwest of Europe and spread most rapidly
to those areas where educational development has made the transfer of tech-
nology most feasible.
It is clear now that the process of growth and diffusion is worldwide.
Human capital as embodiment of skills is a convenient conceptualization of
its role as coordinate factor of production in its contribution to national
economic growth. Human capital as a source of new knowledge shifts production—19—
functions upward and generates woriwide economic growth.
Even though "knowledge knows no boundaries," its utilization requires
local adaptation which is more costly the more dissimilar ("distant") the
economies and societies to which it is transmitted. Moreover, as technical
progress continues, the slower the diffusion the wider the technological
gap between the initiators and the "latecomers." Consequently, the capacity
to absorb and to adapt new technology requires an increasingly specialized
andsophisticated labor force backed by a broadly educated population.
For reasons that certainly make sense in the technology exporting countries,
the imported modern technology is capital and skill intensive. Thus, problems
of "labor absorption" are added to the difficul ties of absorbing modern
technology.21
Yet, the disadvantages of factor bias are transcended by the advan-
tagesof being able to skip several generations of technology in a short
time. At any rate, it is only the most modern technology that is truly
available. Older vintages which may be more labor intensive are not usable
without complementary or ancillary industries which are obsolete. Even if
the initial effects on the creation of highly productive employment are
relatively small, the simultaneous adaptation of human capital by job
training and some job redesign can help to widen the process. Initially,
the pressure of modernization is most acutely felt at the highest education
levels: specialized scientists, technicians and researchers are needed to
adopt, master, and modify the new technologies. But only widespread educa-
tional growth, especially at basic levels of literacy and numeracy can lead
from islands of modernity to a complete transformation of the economy.22-20-
111.Human Capital and Population
According to Malthus, economic growth can only besporadic: It is
self-defeating, since it produces population growth which in turnswallows
all the gains. This theory has long beencontradicted by empirical evidence.
The notion that this hypothesismay be applicable to LDC's which was enter-
tained by some is also being discredited by events.Economic growth has not
been eliminated by rapid population growth inthese countries.
Moreover, the patterns of population change
associated with the "demographic transition' in the Westare now being
visibly repeated in the rest of the world?3 Indeed, thecongruence of
spatial and temporal patterns of economic growth anddemographic change
suggest an important interaction between the two. Human capital isa link
which enters both the causes and effects ofeconomic-demographic changes.
Human capital, or population quality, was left out ofMalthusian
theory. The theory actually omits any economic motivation. Itpresents
a strictly biological view of mortality as a mechanism whichadjusts
numbers of people to available resources. Thecontrary facts of economic
growth and of the demographic transition have led to a reformulation of
population theory in terms of parental decisions about numbers and
"quality of children."24 In primitive, premodern regimes ofvery high
mortality, especially in an agricultural setting, unlimitedfertility may
be viewed as a rational- response, which is also(or therefore?) culturally
sanctioned. Declines in mortality, brought about bypublichealth measures
or by higher levels of living bring about the need forfamily size decisions,
given the family's limited resources. Implicitly such decisionsmust con-
sider both material and 'psychic' costs and returns fromchildren. Intentio-21—
about human capital formation in children, or child 'quality" play a part
in the decision. Given the family budget, resources spent on "quality"
compete with the number of children the family might otherwise want.
This trade—off becomes pronounced in the context of economic growth
which raises the payoff to human capital formation.
In the West, mortality reductions initially resulted in increased
fertility but after a long lag, they were followed by fertility declines.
Surviving average family size grew initially, but eventually declined to
the present-day low levels. Roughly speaking, family size begins to de-
cline when fertility rates drop more sharply than mortality rates.
Although even exogenous declines in mortality tend to induce declines in
fertility, it appears that for birth rates to fall more than death rates,
the additional stimuli of economic growth and of widespread education are
necessary.
This generalization is supported both by the history of DC's and
by current experience inLDC's. An intercountry analysis of changes during
the past decade (1965—1975) in Latin America25 showed that declines in
birth rates were positively related to declines in death rates, but the
declines in births were steeper than the declines in deaths only in coun-
tries whose rates were above average during the decade and educational
enrollments of the population aged 5-14 were significantly above average
at the outset. The regression analysis shows that at a rate of 2% growth
of per capita income the enrollment rate must be at least 80%, to gen—
erate a reduction in family size. With a growth rate of 3%, the minimum
enrollment rate is 60%.-22-
Butwhat is there in the process of economic and educational growth that
makesincipientincentives toward reductions in family size widespread, effective,
and progressive? In a way, the emergence of strong growth implies that some
of the cultural inhibitions to rationalism have already weakened. More directly,
economic theory contains three implications of economic growth which point to
deliberate reductions in family size:(1) urbanization, (2) the rising cost
of time, and (3) educational growth:
(1) Since demands for agricultural products are relatively income and
price inelastic, the growth of productivity reduces the demand for farm laboy,
which in turn flocks to cities in search of employment and higher wages. With
children less productive and more costly to raise in the city than on the farm,
incentives of migrants to limit family size are strong.
(2) The growth of wages in the labor market attracts people from non—
market activities (households and subsistence sectors) to the labor market. Tq
the extent that child—rearing is a time—intensive activity, increases in market
wages represent a rising foregone cost of time spent in child care rather than
in gainful work. Therefore, incentives of women to limit family size and to
enter (or stay in) the labor market appear and grow. This is especially true
of educated women, since opportunity costs increase with education. A strong
negative correlation between education of mothers and family size has been
widely documented.26
(3) With growing incomes and industrial demands for literate, dis-
ciplined, and skilled labor, both private and public demands for education
increase. At the family level ,thedemands for prolonged education of
children represent an additional incentive to substitute "quality" for
the quantity of children, as the reduction in numbers of children increases-23—
the available family resources, per child. The inducement•to invest in
quality and in greater future earning capacity_of the children is strengthened
by increased life expectancy as it constitutes a lengthened "pay—off period'
on the investments. In turn, when the educated children become parents, they
tend to have more favorable attitudes and more infonnation about birth control
behavior and greater demands for education and health of their children.
In sum, we should expect growing urbanization, education, female labor
force participation, and declining family size to follow economic growth.
Such trends are, indeed, widely observed under conditions of sustained
economic growth, although intensities and time lags in these processes can
and do differ from one setting to the next. For example, growing market
wages may induce women into the labor market without reducing their fer-
tility, if the extended family and cheap domestic service can help in
child rearing, and if the nature of work, such as farming or cottage indus-
try are not incompatible with the immediate presence of children. Also, for
a time, growth of wages may reduce fertility without increasing the labor
force: This happens when women employed in the occupations just described
including domestic service move to better paid factory work. All the same,
the extended family institution and the occupations compatible with uninter-
rupted mother's child care eventually decline as incomes and education con-
tinue to grow, and all the predicted effects become apparent as they do in
the industrially developed countries.
The significance of these demographic events for the quality of
labor is twofold:
(1) High birth rates imply an age distribution of the population
heavily weighted toward youth. For example close to one—half of the Mexican—24—
population is less than 15 years of age. This represents a heavy burden on
the economy, since the consumption and educational needs of the young popu-
lation are paramount, and their economic contribution small .Continuation
of declines in birth rates will change the age distribution
toward a more productive labor supply.
(2) Beyond improving he quality of the labor force via changes in
age distribution, reductions in the size of large families apparently also
affect educational progress, as was already alluded. Families with fewer
children can more readily afford educational expenditures. If the frequency
of large families is greater among the poor, the induced demographic changes
have important positive effects on the future distribution of income and on
social mobility.
In this brief exposition it was not possible to do more than sketch
the theory and allude to some of the empirical research which documents the
vital and manifold roleof human capital formation in personal, national,
and global economic development.I think it is fair to conclude that even
if substantial levels of human capital may not be a prerequisite for an accelera-
tion of economic growth at a certain time and place, the concurrent growth and
diffusion of human capital appear to be necessary to insure sustained economic
development.—25—
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